

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INVASION AND U.S. RESPONSE

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## ISSUE DEFINITION

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has raised a number of serious issues and choices for the United States. The train of events seem likely to have an important influence on overall American foreign policy in the 1980s. Reassessment of Soviet motives and of U.S. roles in the world are already in progress. Emerging American attitudes, in turn, will shape more specific policy decisions on the following issues: (1) whether to continue the quest for an expanded detente with the Soviet Union in the areas of arms control, trade, and people-to-people contacts; (2) what measures are needed to enhance U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf region; (3) what kind of role -- if any -- the U.S. should play in supporting opposition Afghan forces and the government of Pakistan's request for security and stability; and (4) to what extent and in what ways should the U.S. enter into cooperative ventures with the People's Republic of China that are directed against the Soviet Union and its allies.

## BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

### AFGHANISTAN: BASIC FACTS AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Afghanistan is a landlocked, arid, and economically underdeveloped country of mountains, deserts, and river valleys located in southern Central Asia at the confluence of the Middle East and the South Asian subcontinent. Unlike neighboring Iran, it is also relatively poor in natural resources. About the size of Texas, it shares boundaries with the Soviet Union to the north, Iran to the southwest, and Pakistan to the east. It also has a very short border with China in the remote Hindu Kush range to the northeast. With an ethnically diverse population of approximately 21 million comprising several distinct tribal groups living on some 260,000 square miles, Afghanistan is 99% Muslim; 80% Sunnis, the majority sect of Islam (unlike neighboring Iran where Shi'ites are predominant), and nearly all are devout, some might say fanatic, adherents of their faith.

Afghanistan has been invaded countless times during its long history; its previous conquerors have included Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane. The British invaded it twice during the 19th century as their empire in India expanded westward and when they sought to halt the spread of Russian influence southward into Persia and Central Asia, and toward the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean beyond. Although the British were defeated by the Afghans in the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42), they succeeded in gaining control of Afghan foreign relations in 1879. Afghanistan thereafter served as a buffer state between Tsarist Russia (and later the Soviet Union) and the British Empire. The British imposed acceptance of a boundary line between Afghanistan and British India in 1893 that divided the tribal homelands of the traditionally warlike Pashtuns (Pathans), the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. This so-called "Pashtunistan" issue has been a cause of continuing tension between the Afghans and the Pakistanis since the independence and partition of British India in 1947.

A third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 brought an end to the British overlordship of Afghanistan and signalled the onset of a period of fragile

independence and relative neutrality under a succession of Afghan monarchs that lasted until 1973. In that year, the last king was deposed by his cousin, former premier Mohammad Daoud, who led a relatively bloodless coup and established himself as leader of the first Afghan republic.

Under Daoud, Afghanistan continued to pursue the Soviet-leaning neutralist foreign policy followed since the World War II period. This policy tacitly -- if warily -- acknowledged the dominant influence of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remained independent and pursued its own generally ineffectual socio-economic policies domestically. Moreover, it accepted economic assistance from and maintained relations with most other countries. The United States maintained sizable AID and Peace Corps programs there for many years prior to 1978. [Total economic assistance, FY 1946-78, was \$504.2 million, of which 80% were grants.] The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, however, provided much more substantial economic and development assistance than any other governments and played a major role in the training and equipment of Afghanistan's armed forces, especially after 1954.

The Daoud regime, never more than nominally socialist, began in 1976 to move increasingly to the right in both domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet Union viewed with growing displeasure the Shah of Iran's attempts to draw Afghanistan into a Western-oriented, Tehran-centered regional economic and security sphere. It was during this 1974-78 period that the Soviets took a new interest in Afghan Communist affairs, and began to support the growth of a unified party. The two Afghan Communist factions merged to form a single Communist party in 1977. It has been alleged that an unsuccessful preemptive strike against the party by Daoud in April 1978, in which a key communist leader was assassinated and many party leaders arrested, provoked the snowdown on Apr. 27, 1978, when Deputy Air Force Commander Maj.Gen. Abdul Qader led a bloody and apparently hastily-organized coup. Two weeks later a new revolutionary council named Nur Mohammad Taraki as its chairman and announced the establishment of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," with Taraki as Prime Minister and Parcham ("Banner") faction leader Babrak Karmal as his deputy. Taraki had been Cultural Officer in the Afghan Embassy, Washington, from 1952-53; had served with the USAID in Kabul from 1962-63. He had subsequently become Secretary-General of the Khalq ("Masses") faction of the Communist Party.

The installation of an Afghan Communist regime under Taraki was perhaps premature under the circumstances, yet pressures from the Daoud regime may have influenced the Afghan Communists to stage their coup before they were organizationally prepared to govern the country. The split in the Communist movement between the Khalq faction under Taraki and the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal and generally considered to be more doctrinaire Marxist, more pro-Soviet, and less nationalistic than the Khalquis, was not significantly reduced by their merger. Within a few weeks of the coup, the Taraki faction was able to dominate the government and "exile" a number of Parcham leaders, including Karmal, to ambassadorships abroad. A purge in August-October 1978 resulted in the removal of a number of Parcham leaders from any public office, and many, including Babrak Karmal (then Afghan envoy to Czechoslovakia), elected to remain in Eastern Europe as "private citizens."

The Taraki regime soon set about initiating a series of changes by decree that flew in the face of conservative Afghan tradition. These included the elimination of rural usury, equal rights for women, and new regulations of dowries, marriage, and land reform, which was probably intended to be a prelude to Soviet-style collectivization. These efforts generated a severe

backlash and fueled the growth of a nationalist-Muslim guerrilla movement in the countryside. The Taraki government also adopted a new red flag barely distinguishable from that of the U.S.S.R. and signed at Moscow a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation, the military provisions of which have been interpreted as almost a formal alliance.

In the meantime, U.S.-Afghan relations, which had been relatively cordial before the overthrow of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973, and which continued to be correct during the Daoud regime, had grown increasingly strained. The Carter Administration continued U.S. bilateral assistance to Afghanistan, although there was some sentiment in Congress for terminating such programs under the terms of section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which prohibited assistance to "any Communist country." In fact, the Administration consciously had refrained from labeling the Taraki regime as Communist, both publicly and in its internal analyses of the political situation, in order to avoid triggering the response mandated under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The kidnapping and subsequent killing of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in a shootout between his left-wing extremist Afghan captors and government security forces at a Kabul hotel on Feb. 14, 1979, cast a pall on already worsening U.S.-Afghan relations. Soviet security advisers appeared to be directing the operation, and the Afghan government disregarded U.S. suggestions that an attempt to rescue Dubs by force be delayed. This created an atmosphere of distrust that never really was overcome during the months that followed. Subsequently, U.S. economic assistance was phased out, the Peace Corps removed, and the size of the U.S. Embassy staff reduced.

Although the Administration had announced a sharp cutback in aid following the death of Ambassador Dubs, it was not totally halted until Aug. 14, when the President signed P.L. 96-53, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, into law. Section 505 of the Act prohibited any further assistance to Afghanistan unless the President certified to Congress that the Afghan government had officially apologized and assumed responsibility for the death of Ambassador Dubs and agreed to provide "adequate protection" for all U.S. government personnel in Afghanistan. The President did have the option of overriding this prohibition if he were to determine it was in the national interest because of "substantially changed circumstances."

Taraki was displaced as Prime Minister in late March 1979, without violence, and named President by his ambitious foreign minister, American-educated Khalq leader Hafizullah Amin. The new Prime Minister relentlessly pursued the same iconoclastic domestic policies, and major uprisings began to occur in the Pashtun tribal area of eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Sporadic revolts, largely uncoordinated, spread to all the country's 29 provinces. Major incidents occurred between April and June 1979, including one in the major northwestern city of Herat, where rebels killed an undetermined number of Russian technicians, their wives and children before the army could restore order. Until the Soviet invasion began on Dec. 24, most of the fighting has occurred between the overwhelmingly conscript Afghan army, with its Russian advisers, and the Afghan guerrillas, including some Pashtun tribesmen from the Pakistani side of the border. There are some 10 separate rebel groups, divided by tribal loyalties and by ideologies, which range from the secular leftist to nonaristocratic rightist. Most, however, are devout Muslims, and two of the major leaders are well-known religious figures. A single leader who could provide overall coordination and direction for these diverse forces has not yet emerged.

By January 1980, the fighting and general unrest inside Afghanistan had caused over 400,000 Afghan refugees to cross the border into neighboring areas of Pakistan; at least 30,000 had fled to Iran. From February 1979 on, Radio Afghanistan began accusing Pakistan and Iran of aiding the guerrillas. Although Pakistan has continued to deny these charges, it is possible that the Pakistanis were unofficially supporting the Afghan guerrillas on a modest scale, just as they have been housing and feeding the refugees "on humanitarian grounds" in 12 camps situated along their border from the northernmost reaches of the country to Baluchistan province in the south.

Tension persisted within the government between Prime Minister Amin and a faction led by President Taraki, while the guerrilla campaigns continued and government programs floundered. The conflict came to a head in September shortly after Taraki's return via Moscow from the nonaligned conference in Havana. Apparently, Taraki had agreed to a Soviet plan that he oust the strong-willed Amin, who had rejected Soviet urging that he broaden the base of the party and at least temporarily halt the collectivist policies that were enraging conservative rural Afghans. It is thought by some American specialists that Amin also refused Moscow's proposal that Soviet combat forces be introduced to put down the tribal rebellions.

At any rate, the ouster of Amin was forestalled when Taraki was killed by forces loyal to Amin in a shootout at the presidential palace on Sept. 14 or 15, although his death was not officially confirmed for several days. During the three months following the death of Taraki, the internal security situation continued to worsen. By early December, only Kabul, the capital, and five other major urban centers were firmly controlled by government forces. The largely conscripted Afghan army had been weakened by rebellion, desertions, and purges of its senior ranks. Many units, complete with Soviet-supplied weapons, had gone over to the rebels with whom they sympathized. Over 4,000 Soviet military advisers had been assigned to the army down to the battalion level; Soviet civilian technicians were also helping to run the government.

### The Soviet Role and Invasion

Russian interest in Afghanistan predates Soviet history, reflecting both geopolitical factors and the ethnic ties between the Afghans and the people of Soviet Central Asia. Since Tsarist times, Russia has been a competitor for influence in this traditionally neutral buffer along its southern border.

The creation of the Soviet state in 1917 marked the beginning of a closer relationship between the two countries. The Soviet government supported Afghanistan in its war for independence from Great Britain in 1919. In 1921, the Soviet and Afghan governments signed a nonaggression pact. The suppression by Moscow of the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia led Afghanistan to distance itself from the Soviet Union in the 1930s. By the 1950s, relations had begun to improve, although until 1978 Afghanistan remained essentially a neutral buffer state.

Even before the April 1978 coup which ousted President Daoud, the Soviet Union had become Afghanistan's major trading partner and its primary source of economic and military assistance. Between 1954 and 1977, the Soviet Union provided \$1.3 billion in aid on terms that were highly favorable by Soviet standards. According to Soviet sources, Soviet-built plants provided 25% of Afghanistan's industrial output in 1977. There were, by that time, already

1,300 Soviet technicians in the country. The major part of Afghanistan's transportation network (including roads and airports), as well as its electric power capacity, were built with Soviet assistance. The Soviets developed Afghanistan's natural gas industry, which supplies some 3 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the Soviet Union via a Soviet-built pipeline.

Soviet military aid prior to 1978 was no less substantial. Between 1956 and 1977, the Soviet Union supplied 95% of Afghanistan's weapons and military needs, in addition to training some 3,700 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supplied over \$600 million worth of weapons including surface-to-air-missiles, fighter planes, helicopter, tanks, and armored vehicles.

While there is no clear evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the April 1978 coup which installed Nur Mohammad Taraki, there is little doubt of Soviet support. The Soviet Union had become increasingly concerned by President Daoud's apparent shift to the right in domestic and foreign policy. They were aware of Daoud's plans to seek larger scale U.S. aid during a planned official visit to Washington in September 1978 and also resented his dismissal of a number of Soviet-trained military officers and his public denunciation of Cuba's self-proclaimed nonaligned status. They also viewed with displeasure the reversal of Daoud's 1974-76 policy of assigning Soviet military advisers down to the company level.

The Soviet Union was a clear beneficiary of the April 1978 coup. The new Taraki-led government, while not really in the mold of a Soviet puppet regime, provided a definite pro-Soviet tilt to Afghan domestic and foreign policies. The Soviet Union gave strong public endorsement to the new government. A 20-year bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty was signed on Dec. 5, 1978. It contained more specific language regarding military and security cooperation than is usually found in similar Soviet treaties. During 1978, the number of Soviet technicians and military advisors more than quadrupled.

As Islamic resistance to the government's Marxist program mounted, the Taraki government became increasingly dependent on Soviet assistance in fighting the rebels. Visits to Kabul by high-level Soviet military delegations in April and August of 1979 signaled a more direct Soviet military involvement in the Afghan government's fight against rebel forces.

At the same time, Soviet leaders almost certainly were apprehensive over the Taraki-Amin leadership's moves to eliminate Parcham leaders in the summer of 1978. Some analysts argue that Babrak Karmal, who went into exile in Eastern Europe, had been the Soviet candidate for party leadership. There were also indications that the Soviet Union had unsuccessfully urged Afghan leaders to broaden the base of the government and to slow their ruthless modernization program in order to quell the growing insurrection by Islamic rebels. When the more militant and dogmatic Hafizullah Amin removed Taraki and assumed full control of the government in September 1979, Western analysts generally assumed that Amin's action had Soviet support and signaled a Soviet decision against seeking accommodation with Islamic nationalists and an all-out effort instead to crush the rebellion. Subsequent analyses concluded that during Taraki's visit to Moscow immediately prior to his ouster and death, Soviet leaders had in fact advised him to remove Amin, but that the effort backfired.

The Soviet Union, nonetheless, publicly backed Amin after he took over and stepped up its aid to the government's campaign to crush the rebellion.

Despite Soviet support, Amin appeared to be losing ground against rebel forces. A large Soviet military delegation headed by a Deputy Defense Minister, General Ivan Pavlovsky, had been in Afghanistan from August through October to assess the insurgency and devise a plan to cope with it. U.S. officials say that Pavlovsky delivered a grim report on his return home, and that this assessment undoubtedly was a major factor in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December.

The Soviets made one last effort to cooperate with Amin in early November when a combined Soviet-Afghan operation was launched in Paktia province south of Kabul, the site of a major guerrilla concentration near the Pakistan border. The campaign was initially successful, but the victory was short-lived, since the insurgents regained control of the area once the Afghan-Soviet force and returned to its bases.

The first public sign of Soviet displeasure with Amin and growing concern for its substantial investment in Afghanistan appeared in Pravda on Dec. 7, 1979. The paper carried a message from Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin on the anniversary of the signing of the bilateral friendship treaty. The Soviet greeting to the Amin government was correct but cooler than past Soviet messages. It did not contain the usual assurances of continued Soviet aid and support for the government, although Soviet support was reaffirmed in lower level Soviet media commentary.

By early December, while the Iran crisis was dominating public and media attention, the U.S. Administration was concerned over signs that the Soviet Union might be preparing to escalate its military presence in Afghanistan, as evidenced by a major buildup of Soviet forces along the Afghan border. On Dec. 8 and 9, a unit of Soviet troops with tanks and heavy armor was airlifted to the Soviet-controlled Bagram air field north of Kabul. This force moved north to eliminate rebel troops along the road between Kabul and the Soviet border (the subsequent invasion route). The U.S. Administration stepped up its warnings to the Soviets against direct intervention, as revealed in a State Department briefing for reporters on Dec. 22.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on Dec. 24 with the airlifting of 5,000 Soviet airborne troops to Kabul. U.S. officials quoted in the press speculate that there was probably one last Soviet attempt on Dec. 24 to persuade President Amin to revise his policies along lines more acceptable to Moscow. The Soviet ambassador reportedly met with Amin that day to urge him once more to permit Soviet combat forces to operate against the rebel forces inside Afghanistan, and pursue less ambitious social and economic policies.

According to the same official U.S. sources, Amin may have sensed danger and then moved in a small armored convoy from the presidential palace in the center of Kabul to Darulaman palace 7 miles to the southwest. On Dec. 27, the day of the coup, elements of a 5,000-man Soviet airborne division made their way from the Kabul airport in armored vehicles across the city to the Darulaman palace. Many were reportedly Soviet Central Asian Tajiks and Uzbeks, members of ethnic groups also represented in Afghanistan. After a short violent armed clash between Amin's guards and the Soviets, the President was apparently captured, "tried," and executed, along with members of his family and retinue.

Soon thereafter, although it is not clear exactly when, Amin's arch-rival, Babrak Karmal, and other exiled Parcham leaders were airlifted back to Kabul from Eastern Europe by the Russians. Prior to Karmal's actual return, a recorded statement by him was broadcast on what appeared to be Radio Kabul,

but the source was later determined to be a transmitter in Termez on the Soviet side of the border, using Radio Kabul's assigned frequencies. Karnal declared that the "bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin" had been overthrown.

Within a few days of the invasion and Amin's ouster, Western analysts became convinced that the Soviet military action represented a massive and long-term commitment by the Soviet Union to crush the Muslim rebellion and to ensure an Afghan government favorable to Moscow. By the end of December there were said to be at least 200 Soviet aircraft involved in the campaign. By Jan. 10, the initial 5,000-man invasion force had mushroomed to an estimated 85,000. Soviet forces reportedly included six motorized rifle divisions, each consisting of an estimated 13,000 troops, 265 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, supported by artillery, "frog" rockets, and helicopters. New troops continued to pour into the country daily.

The Soviet action marks the first direct Soviet military intervention abroad since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the first large-scale fighting by Soviet troops abroad since the fighting with Chinese forces on the Ussuri River in 1969; and the first direct Soviet military intervention in a country outside the Soviet bloc since the end of World War II.

A central issue likely to shape future U.S.-Soviet relations is why the Soviet Union now decided to undertake such an action with its entailed risks and negative repercussions. The U.S., as well as other Western and nonaligned governments, have rejected the Soviet explanation that it was simply complying with its treaty obligations to protect Afghanistan from foreign interference at the urgent request of the Afghan government; many governments have pointed out that the Soviet claim is absurd, given the fact that the existing Afghan government was ousted by the Soviets.

President Carter stated on Dec. 28 that the event had substantially changed his view of the Soviet Union. In his speech to the nation on Jan. 4, 1980, President Carter expressed the view that the Soviets might be seeking to use Afghanistan as a step in an effort to expand their influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. Current Western assessments of Soviet objectives follow two conflicting lines, one emphasizing the defensive and reactive nature of the Soviet action, limited to protecting its interests in Afghanistan; the other stressing the offensive and opportunistic nature of the move into Afghanistan as an action in support of broader Soviet regional ambitions.

Arguments supporting the defensive or reactive interpretation are based on the view that the Amin government was clearly not effective in its campaign to crush the growing rebellion and gain control of the country. There was a real danger from the Soviet perspective that Amin could fall and be replaced by an anti-Soviet Islamic government. Such an outcome would have meant the loss of the substantial Soviet investment in Afghanistan and would have represented a major setback to the Soviet position in Asia and the Persian Gulf. It could have heightened the Islamic fervor sweeping Iran and other countries of the region, intensifying Soviet fears of Islamic fundamentalism engulfing the approximately 50-million Muslim inhabitants of the Soviet Central Asian Republics. Now that some 50% of the Soviet population is non-Russian, the Soviet leadership is keenly sensitive to the danger of unrest among its national minorities. According to some analysts, however, Soviet leaders decided to intervene in Afghanistan and replace the ineffective and unreliable Amin only reluctantly and against their cautious instincts in order to eliminate these threats.



The arguments for offensive or opportunistic interpretations stress that the Soviet Union found itself facing unique opportunities in a region that has been the target of traditional Soviet ambitions. At a time of unprecedented Soviet military strength and confidence, an exploitable situation of chaos and turmoil reigned in Iran, heightening the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf and Pakistan. It was obvious to the Soviets that the United States, already hostage to its Iranian situation, would not be in a position to challenge the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The Soviets may also have speculated that the U.S. would be less likely to react since Afghanistan had little direct strategic importance. Some analysts argue that Soviet confidence on this score was strengthened by the mild U.S. response to earlier Soviet moves in Afghanistan and also in Indochina and Africa. Whatever retaliatory action the United States might take in trade or other areas, the Afghan venture was calculated to be worth the price, particularly since prospects for ratification of SALT II were already dim. Any loss of good will from Third World countries, according to some analysts, would be more than offset by new respect for Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to use it. Success in crushing the Afghan rebels would leave Moscow in an unprecedented position to take advantage of Iranian instability and Pakistan's weakness to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas at Western expense. A few analysts have speculated that the Soviet action reflects the ascent of hawks in the Soviet leadership, as a result of President Brezhnev's declining health.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may not have been motivated exclusively by either defensive or opportunistic considerations, but rather some combination of both. But whatever the original motivations, they may be in a position to achieve both objectives. Ultimate Soviet success is by no means a certainty, but the rate of Soviet military escalation seems to indicate a calculation by Moscow that it can achieve a rapid and decisive outcome. A long-term occupation remains a very real possibility, and some observers believe that Soviet forces may venture beyond Afghanistan's borders.

#### FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS

##### The Arab World

The Soviet military invasion of Muslim Afghanistan has been met, in general, with varying degrees of condemnation from the Arab states. Only the Marxist regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.) has voiced support for the Soviet action. Algeria, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), however, have thus far been conspicuous by their silence.

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf littoral, in concert with Saudi Arabia, were particularly vociferous in expressions of concern. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal conferred on Jan. 4 with representatives of Arab and Islamic countries in order to seek a clear-cut, united Muslim stand that possibly may take the form of a summit meeting in the near future. Saudi and other Gulf news media have called for serious military and moral action, stressing that the Soviet intervention represents a new strategy on the part of Moscow that has resulted from the inconsistencies, uncertainties and weakness of American policy. They referred to the "internal structure in the United States," which still suffered from the Vietnam experience and Watergate. They compared Soviet justification for its Afghanistan adventure

with those accompanying intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was also stated that, following bitter Soviet failures in Sudan, Somalia, and Chile, the Soviet Union had shed its reservations and had decided to undertake a policy of direct military intervention into the internal affairs of independent states.

Iraq, a major client for Soviet military hardware and training, rebuked the Soviet Union over Afghanistan, comparing it unfavorably with the United States in its endeavors to dominate smaller countries. In Belgrade on Jan. 5, the Iraqi and Yugoslav foreign ministers called upon nonaligned countries to resist intervention in the Middle East and the Gulf, and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces in Afghanistan.

The government of Oman, following its strong denunciation of the Soviet invasion, was reported to have granted U.S. forces use of its naval and air facilities in order to support a strengthened American presence in the region. Both Egypt and Israel have issued statements offering the United States use of military facilities to heighten American power in the Middle East. Egyptian President al-Sadat on Jan. 4 emphasized that such use would not be tantamount to base rights.

The Muslim World League and the Islamic Congress have condemned Soviet aggression in Muslim Afghanistan. At the United Nations, five Arab states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Morocco -- joined Western and other Third World countries in signing a letter requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Afghanistan situation.

#### Iran

A statement issued by the Iranian government on Dec. 29 termed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile act... against all the Muslims of the world." The Khomeini regime, including the Ayatollah himself, thus far has refrained from any further condemnation of the Soviet move. Over the past year, the Ayatollah had denounced the former Taraki and Amin regimes for the anti-Islamic tones of their policies and had called upon Afghanistan's armed forces, police and civil service to turn against the "corrupt atheists" who had attempted to subvert the country's traditional Islamic culture. In turn, Kabul increasingly had accused "prejudicial religious elements" in Iran of having aided Muslim resistance movements in Afghanistan.

Several thousand Afghans, together with Iranian supporters, stormed the Soviet embassy in Tehran on Jan. 1, 1980, but soon thereafter negotiated a withdrawal with Iranian authorities. In Mashad, some 5,000 Afghans and Iranians demonstrated outside the Soviet consulate. Estimates vary on the number of Afghani expatriates in Iran, with maximum figures given as 500,000. Since April 1978, according to official figures, about 30,000 Afghan refugees have emigrated to Iran.

The Khomeini regime's primary preoccupation has been the achievement of legitimacy for a theocratic form of government and internal security. Faced with continuing political fragmentation and economic chaos, it is highly sensitive to events in neighboring Afghanistan. As long as the central government in Tehran and Qom is unable to reimpose its authority over the provinces, ethnically based demands for regional autonomy, and even secession, will continue. If the Soviets are able to install a reasonably stable regime in Kabul, the potential for inciting and supporting ethnic nationalism in Iran is substantial. Of particular concern is the movement

for an independent Baluchistan, which Afghanistan historically has supported as a means of gaining access to the Indian Ocean. The Afghani Marxist parties have had a close working relationship with the Iranian Communist Tudeh Party and other leftist groups. Iranian radicals have undergone training, including Marxist indoctrination and guerrilla training, at two Afghani Soviet-supervised training camps at Mazari-i-Sharif, near the Soviet border.

### Pakistan and India

The recent events in Afghanistan have caused great distress in Pakistan where there is much concern about the potential for Soviet-inspired and directed subversion of the country. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long border over which they have been at odds for many years. Autonomy-minded tribal groups, straddling the boundary, have been a major threat to the integrity of Pakistan and complicating factor in attempts to resolve its disputes with Afghanistan. While negotiations with the previous Afghan regimes set with little or no success, at least there was the feeling in Pakistan that the contending parties were equally matched. Soviet control of Afghanistan appears to make the country a potentially far more formidable opponent. It is feared that a Soviet-dominated regime will be aggressive in pursuing an active policy of subversion among Pakistan's dissident ethnic groups (especially Baluchis and Pushtus), thereby raising to a much higher level the possibility of the region's balkanization and an end to Pakistan as it exists today. Having lost the east wing of the country -- Bangladesh -- less than a decade ago, the Pakistanis are particularly sensitive to this prospect. As a result of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, Pakistani officials are said to be anxious for a return to large-scale U.S. arms shipments which have been severely restricted since the India-Pakistan War of 1965.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses an indirect threat to India, which shares no border with the embattled central Asian country. Criticism and opposition have been expressed in many quarters over the Soviet military action, but the new government of Indira Gandhi has accepted the Soviet rationale for the invasion. The greatest concern of Indian leaders at this juncture revolves around Pakistan's response to the intervention -- and its possible implications. There is considerable apprehension that the crisis will lead to strengthened ties between Pakistan and the United States, with a consequent resumption of U.S. deliveries of military equipment. Such an influx of new and sophisticated weaponry is seen by Indians as having a major destabilizing effect on the always sensitive balance of forces between India and Pakistan. The possibility of a closer military relationship between China and Pakistan is also viewed with concern by Indian leaders. After three wars with Pakistan, in which the latter employed weapons supplied by the United States, and a fourth war with China, India is suspicious of any U.S. military assistance in the region designed to strengthen Pakistan.

### People's Republic of China (P.R.C.)

China steadily escalated its condemnation of the Soviet Union following the Soviet-backed coup in Kabul and the buildup of Soviet forces throughout Afghanistan. In authoritative press and government statements, Peking said that these developments pose a direct threat to Chinese security and mark the most serious escalation of Soviet expansionism abroad in over a decade. Peking has yet to pledge authoritatively its support for the armed resistance

to the Soviets in Afghanistan, although Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping seemed to come close to a statement of outright support when he warily praised on Jan. 6 "heroic resistance" of the Afghan people. Also, Peking has thus far not reaffirmed backing for Pakistan, Afghanistan's vulnerable neighbor and a traditionally close ally of the P.R.C. Chinese comment has offered general pledges to join in worldwide efforts against this and other instances of Soviet aggression, giving special prominence to calls for Sino-American "joint countermeasures." It has advised pointedly that "actual steps" must be taken in order to check the Soviet advance toward "global hegemonism," and in this regard, has highlighted statements of U.S. counteractions by President Carter and U.S. officials.

among the other notable features of China's reaction, Peking said that:

(1) Soviet objectives in Afghanistan range far beyond a desire to control that country and represent an important step in the Kremlin's plan to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean and control Western oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region.

(2) The Soviet move came at this time in part because the Soviet Union saw that the United States was preoccupied with the crisis in Iran and had "helplessly taken a defensive position" in rivalry with the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East.

(3) The invasion served as a warning to other Third World rulers with close ties to the U.S.S.R., demonstrating that the Soviets are unscrupulous conspirators "like Hitler" who will use and dispose of allies as they see fit.

(4) There is a clear link between the Afghanistan invasion and Soviet-backed aggression by Vietnam in Indochina because the less-than-firm world reaction against Vietnam encouraged the Soviets to feel free to invade Afghanistan.

## U.S. Allies

### Western Europe

Our European allies, in contrast to their somewhat qualified initial reactions to the crisis in Iran, immediately joined the United States in strongly condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The NATO Council was convened in Brussels on New Year's Day to discuss the action. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who represented the U.S. at the session, reported that the allies discussed a variety of retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union at the session, including: (1) boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow; (2) stopping wheat sales; (3) breaking off cultural exchanges; and (4) refusing to renew commercial credits.

Although no decisions were adopted at the meeting, it appeared there was a general consensus that whatever actions are taken should be "firm, convincing and credible." One NATO ambassador stated: "We dare not take actions we cannot really deliver on because our credibility will suffer."

At the Jan. 1, NATO meeting and in preliminary talks conducted by Secretary Christopher with ranking West European diplomats in London, the U.S. found a common front with the European allies. They expressed mutual concern over the "extreme seriousness" of the Soviet aggression, and the need

for the Western Alliance to respond forcefully. NATO Secretary Luns called the Soviet invasion "a flagrant violation of international law and a threat to world peace."

In other allied reactions, Britain and several other NATO members instructed their ambassadors to avoid contact with the new Soviet-backed government in Kabul. On Jan. 4, several West European representatives, along with U.S., Pakistan, and other Asian diplomats, presented a request to the U.N. Security Council for a formal debate on the Soviet invasion. On Jan. 6, however, France deviated from the solidarity expressed by its West European allies, and refused to line up behind President Carter's program of economic countermeasures against the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet argued that France, as the "witness" and originator of East-West detente 35 years ago, is duty-bound not to act hastily. Francois-Poncet added that it would be a grave error to "Westernize the Afghanistan affair" since it appears primarily a conflict between the Soviets and the Islamic world rather than an East-West confrontation.

On Jan. 7, Argentina joined the Common Market and Canada in temporarily suspending new export licenses for wheat, corn, soybeans, and other agricultural products in response to President Carter's announcement that the U.S. will refuse to sell 17 million metric tons of additional grain to the Soviet Union. The Australian government is expected to hold a special cabinet meeting to consider Australia's response to a request from Washington to support U.S. measures by not increasing sales to the Soviet Union to offset the grains the U.S. is denying the Soviets. Finally, the Common Market suspended export subsidies and the granting of licenses for grain and dairy product exports to the Soviet Union.

The Afghanistan incident is likely to contribute to a further cooling of relations between NATO countries and the Soviet Union, already strained by the Atlantic Alliance's decision in December 1979 to produce and deploy a new generation of American intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union. It also appears likely that the United States and its European allies could be drawn closer together as a result of the Soviet military intervention designed to tie Afghanistan more firmly into the Soviet sphere of influence. It would not be surprising, however, if the allies prefer to structure the Western response along the lines indicated by France, so that, while strongly condemning the Soviet action, the way would be left open to a future constructive relationship with Moscow.

### Japan

Japan has reacted with somewhat more caution than the West European allies, although the government has issued public statements domestically and at the U.N. strongly condemning the Soviet invasions. Japan also announced that it would refuse to recognize the new Soviet-installed government in Kabul and would continue to withhold economic aid, which it ceased in the fall of 1979 because of internal instability in Afghanistan. The Japanese government is reportedly considering a number of additional steps, but it appears hesitant to go along with U.S. economic countermeasures because officials believe trade sanctions might end up hurting Japan economically more than the Soviet Union. In 1978, Japan exported \$2.6 billion worth of products to the Soviet Union, while it imported only about \$1.8 billion worth of goods during the same period.

In successive governments since the end of the Cold War, Japanese prime

ministers have sought to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, and current Prime Minister Ohira would probably not support any measures that would seriously undermine that already cool relationship. Moreover, Japan is very aware of a sizable build-up of Soviet troops and facilities on the Kurile Islands (taken over by the Soviets at the end of World War II, but still claimed by the Japanese) as well as growing Soviet military power in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

In summary, Japan may consider adopting stronger measures against the Soviet Union, such as postponing loan commitments for joint Soviet-Japanese development projects; but is unlikely to impose any sanctions that would severely disrupt its lucrative trade with the Soviet Union or anger the Soviets politically.

## U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

### Overview

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appears to have triggered a major reassessment of the role of the United States in the world. This reassessment could mean a reversal of retrenchment in world affairs brought on by the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" and the reassertion of a forward policy of qualified globalism.

Ever since its setback in the Vietnam war, the United States has been caught up in a national mood of withdrawal from globalism, and the military implications of such a role. Analysts have popularly referred to this phenomenon as the "Vietnam syndrome," meaning "never again" will the United States become involved in a foreign war over less than vital interests.

Accordingly, global commitments were reduced under the Nixon doctrine, which emphasized the responsibility of U.S. allies to provide for their own security and regional responsibility in providing security. This tendency continued through the Ford and Carter Administrations. The Carter Administration has emphasized a policy of avoiding intervention by military means overseas.

Detente with the Soviet Union coincided with this development. Agreements were reached with the Soviet Union in which the United States attempted to stabilize the relationship with a mutually acceptable strategic balance and with formally agreed "rules of the game" for governing their rivalry, notably in the Third World. In some respects this arrangement conformed to the prevailing mood of the American people: it seemed to be the rationale for global retrenchment while achieving some form of strategic stability with the Soviet Union.

But the Soviet Union had its own interpretation of detente or peaceful coexistence upon which this relationship was based. This interpretation contrasted sharply with that of the United States.

Brezhnev argued that detente did not preclude Soviet support for the "National Liberation Movements" in the Third World. Ostensibly doctrine -- but perceived Soviet geopolitical interests as well -- called for such support. Accordingly, the Soviet Union pursued an interventionist policy in the Third World, specifically in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Indonesia. It did so against the protests of the United States that such behavior

violated detente and that the pursuit of expansionist goals in the Third World was destabilizing. An ambiguous relationship resulted: accommodation was reached through the SALT process, on the assumption held by both governments that SALT was in the interests of both nations. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued a steady expansion of their military capabilities, and the Third World became the major area of contention and potential confrontation.

Developments in the Middle East and in South Asia in 1979 highlighted U.S. losses and vulnerabilities in the Third World.

The fall of the Shah in early 1979 and the subsequent instability in the Persian Gulf region exposed the vulnerability of the Middle East oil resources vital to the western world and underscored geopolitical shortcomings of the U.S. entrenchment policy. It compelled a reassessment of U.S. strategic interests in the area. Qualified foreign policy observers spoke confidently of a substantial weakening of the "Vietnam syndrome" as plans got underway for strengthening the U.S. position in the Middle East. Some concrete military measures were undertaken in Europe and with regard to the MX missile. The seizure of the American hostages in Teheran during the fall of 1979 quickened the pace of this apparent reversal of policy.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan now appears to have accelerated the process of reversal from retrenchment toward reinforcement of some form of qualified globalism, the nature and limits of which have yet to be determined. The United States may well, at this point, be challenged to try to create a policy based on a new national consensus, and require the necessary military power to support whatever role it determines to play.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has profoundly shaken the policy of detente with the Soviet Union and, for some, has raised larger questions of what destiny the United States sees for itself as a leading advocate of world democracy in the decades ahead. More specifically, it has compelled the United States to face up to the ambiguity of detente itself with respect to the Third World.

The Administration has already pledged continued adherence to the SALT I and SALT II agreements so long as the Soviets do. The Soviets have yet to reply. One indicator of Soviet expectations in determining the relationship for the future, therefore, would seem to lie in whether the Soviets will sidestep aside by SALT, even though ratification has been temporarily stalled in the United States. The Soviet response could do much to clarify whether detente has indeed been abandoned in Moscow for a renewal of the "cold war."

#### National Interests: Afghanistan

U.S. options for influencing events in Afghanistan are limited to providing direct or indirect assistance to the Afghan guerrilla forces and refugees, and to support the regime of President Zia ul Haq in neighboring Pakistan. In both cases, the options would appear to require working through the government of Pakistan, since that country is the only haven of the Afghan insurgents to which the U.S. has access. Opposition forces operate from within both the Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier provinces of Pakistan. Given the state of U.S.-Iranian relations, it seems unlikely that the United States could channel any aid through Iran.

Regional Implications: Pakistan and India

In recent years, U.S. policy has shifted away from Pakistan and toward India. Detente reduced the importance of Pakistan as a key link in the U.S. security network created to contain the Soviet Union. Also, the secession of Bangladesh in 1972, halving Pakistan's population and land mass, reinforced India's claim that it was, by virtue of its size, resources, and location, the dominant power of the subcontinent.

One effect of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, however, will almost certainly be to reverse the trend of a declining U.S. interest in Pakistan -- at least for a period of time. Because it shares a long, difficult-to-defend border with Afghanistan, Pakistan again is likely to assume a major strategic dimension in the view of U.S. policymakers.

If the United States does decide to increase significantly the supply of military equipment to Pakistan, one of the results, already apparent in the public statements of India's leaders, will be to place considerable strain on U.S.-Indian relations. It will be the task of the United States to balance its requirement to protect its security interest in this part of the world with the need to reassure India that its actions will not upset the existing balance of power on the subcontinent. This problem is complicated by the return to power of Indira Gandhi, whose previous governments have been sympathetic to Soviet foreign policy objectives. While the events in Afghanistan tend to draw the United States and Pakistan together, cooperation will be hindered by several events and factors, among them being: (1) the U.S. decision in early 1979 (required by a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) to suspend aid to Pakistan because of its covert development of nuclear weapons; and (2) the burning of the American Embassy in Islamabad in late 1979 by an angry crowd of Muslim demonstrators who were reacting to false rumors of American complicity in the takeover of the mosque in Mecca. In addition, several issues may be addressed: (1) whether to cooperate with Pakistan in aiding the Afghan rebels; (2) the extent of commonality with China in policy toward Pakistan; (3) defining Pakistan's needs (military, economic, and political) for greater resiliency in the new situation; and (4) how to respond if U.S.-Pakistani support of Afghan rebels triggers Afghan-Soviet military countermeasures against Pakistan.

Regional Implications: The Middle East

The Middle East has been and remains of vital importance to the security and economic well-being of the United States and its allies. U.S. interests dictate that the region cannot be permitted to fall under the predominant influence or control of a hostile power. Since Middle East oil is, and will be for some time to come, necessary to the world economy, the United States and other consuming countries need to be assured of its availability. The present position of dependence upon Middle East oil is one of dangerous vulnerability because decisions both on access and on price are not in allied hands. The relationship has engendered substantial distrust between the producing and consuming nations.

The Soviet Union is aware that the Western powers have vital interests in the Middle East. Soviet efforts to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa, the P.D.R.Y. (South Yemen) and Afghanistan, however, indicate Soviet determination to venture in the region, while estimating the will and capacity of the West to respond.



Several Arab states perceive the United States as having been unable or unwilling to respond to Soviet moves in Africa or the Middle East, and they have pointed to U.S. refusal to support its regional allies, as demonstrated by Arab embargoes against Turkey and Pakistan and the lack of U.S. action during the fall of the Shah. It is possible that these Arab perceptions of Soviet superiority in the Horn, southern Arabia and Afghanistan, coupled with increased regional instability following the Iranian revolution, could induce the governing elites of the Gulf Arab states to reorient their foreign policies in order to ensure their internal security and survival unless the United States manifests a credible commitment to their protection.

The question of an increased American presence in or near the Gulf region remains a sensitive one. The interventionist threats of former Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary Schlesinger in the mid-1970s appeared hollow and caused adverse reaction among the Gulf states. In 1979, they rejected an Omani proposal to invite Western participation in the administration of Gulf security. The Carter Administration, however, has announced plans to organize a worldwide forward deployment force which, presumably, would be used in the Gulf region in the event of a threat to Western oil supplies.

In the face of Soviet moves in the region, including the military invasion of Afghanistan, a key question remains how well the various authorities in the region can maintain sufficient control of their productive capacity, the sea lanes through the Strait of Hormuz, and their internal security.

#### Superpower Considerations: U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had an immediate chilling effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. It brought on sharp rhetoric between the superpowers and led to U.S. decisions affecting SALT, diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Administration has announced that it is considering other counteractions in response to Soviet moves in Afghanistan. Whether the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations is merely a short-term phenomenon, as it was after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or a more long-term shift remains to be seen. But the new problems in bilateral relations stemming from the Afghan crisis only add to the growing difficulties between the two countries that were already evident.

Major U.S. decisions to increase the defense budget and improve the military balance were already in progress before the invasion of Afghanistan. The decision by NATO countries to introduce new theater nuclear weapons in Europe had also been made. The Soviet intervention is likely to strengthen support for these moves in the United States and other NATO countries.

The first U.S. response to the Soviet intervention came in the form of strong unilateral protest against the move and an announced campaign to bring world pressure to bear against the Soviet Union. On Dec. 28, President Carter told reporters that the Soviet invasion represented a "grave threat to peace" and a blatant violation of international law. The following day, the President sent a message to Soviet leader Brezhnev over the hot-line, demanding that the Soviet Union remove its troops from Afghanistan or face grave consequences. He warned that the Soviet action would "severely and adversely" affect U.S.-Soviet relations "now and in the future."

In his reply to the Carter message, Soviet President Brezhnev defended the

Soviet move as a legitimate response to a request by the Afghan government. In a televised interview on Dec. 31, President Carter rejected the Soviet reply, saying that the Soviet leader had not told the truth. He stated that the Soviet action had changed his opinion of the Russians more dramatically than any other event during his Administration.

The Soviet Union publicly responded to the Carter statements with some harsh personal attacks on the President, accusing him of propaganda "breaking all records for hypocrisy and lies." The Soviet press characterized President Carter as "wicked and malicious" and accused the United States of complicity in arming and training the Afghan rebels.

A further U.S. response to the Soviet invasion was in the form of joint action with European and Third World nations to bring the matter of the Soviet invasion before the United Nations Security Council. The Council began its debate on Afghanistan on Jan. 5 at the request of 50 U.N. member nations. On Jan. 7, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion and demanding that Soviet forces be withdrawn. The U.S. indicated that, as a result of the Soviet veto, it would seek to bring the question before the U.N. General Assembly where the Soviet Union has no veto.

The next action taken by the U.S. was to recall Ambassador Thomas Watson from Moscow on Jan. 2. On the same day it was announced that the Carter administration had decided to ask the Senate to delay its consideration of the SALT Treaty. The Administration indicated that it was taking this step reluctantly because SALT II was still viewed as being in the U.S. interest. The President subsequently said that the U.S. would continue to abide by the terms of SALT I, as long as the Soviet Union did the same.

Specific U.S. responses to Soviet actions in Afghanistan were announced in President Carter's message to the nation on Jan. 4. The U.S. measures included:

(1) Blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million metric tons already contracted. This means withholding an additional 17 million metric tons which the Soviets have already ordered.

(2) Stopping the sale of high technology and strategic items to the Soviet Union, including computers and oil drilling equipment.

(3) Curbing Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. The catch allowed Soviet fishing fleets in 1980 would be reduced from 350,000 tons to 75,000 tons, resulting in an estimated Soviet economic loss of \$55 million to \$60 million.

(4) Delaying the opening of a new Soviet consulate in New York and an American consulate in Kiev.

(5) Postponing new cultural and economic exchanges between the two countries, now under consideration.

(6) Holding open the possibility that the United States might not participate in the Moscow summer olympics of 1980.

Administration officials indicated that there could be other U.S. moves in retaliation for the Soviet aggression. According to press reports on Jan. 6, possible further actions under consideration include a cutback in staffs

of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, reduction of the staff of the U.S. and other Western embassies in Kabul, and multilateral Western efforts to curtail Western bank credits for Moscow.

The Soviet Union dismissed these challenges in its first high-level official response, carried by the Soviet news agency Tass on Jan. 6. The authoritative Tass statement warned that the U.S. actions would be at least as harmful to the United States as to the Soviet Union and stressed that any attempt to influence Soviet foreign policy through such measures was doomed to fail. President Carter was said to have failed to consider the real international situation, overestimating the "potentialities" of the United States and underestimating the "potentialities" of the country being targeted for reprisals. It warned that the United States should not doubt the Soviet ability to defend its interests. The statement concluded with the expressed hope that a "sane, far-sighted approach" to Soviet-American relations would eventually prevail in the United States.

The question now is what the impact will be of the measures announced by President Carter. While these moves serve to underline U.S. displeasure over Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, there is a general consensus that they are not likely to compel the Soviets to reverse their policies in Afghanistan. Soviet leaders probably took the possibility of such U.S. reprisals into account, as possible consequences of their move into Afghanistan, and decided that they were a price worth paying. In addition, some of the reprisals clearly have an adverse impact on the United States as well as on the Soviet Union.

On the issue of SALT, the Soviets may well have concluded, prior to their move into Afghanistan, that there was no likelihood of favorable U.S. Senate action. The short-term prospects for SALT and other arms control measures have clearly been dimmed by the current crisis. A major question now is what the long-term prospects are for both the SALT process and for other arms control discussions, including the Vienna Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) and anticipated discussions on limiting theater nuclear weapons in Europe. President Carter kept the door open to an eventual SALT agreement by underlining his continued support for it and by offering to continue to abide by the terms of the SALT I accord. The Soviet response to President Carter's offer may give some indication as to whether Moscow is still committed to the SALT process or whether, instead, it has written off the entire exercise.

The economic sanctions announced by President Carter are bound to sharply reduce the already modest U.S.-Soviet trade volume. The overall impact on the U.S. economy will be limited. Only U.S. farmers will feel any significant pinch, although the Administration has pledged to cushion that impact through a number of domestic measures. The extent of the impact of these economic reprisals on the Soviet economy will depend in large measure on whether the Soviets can find alternate Western suppliers for the goods it will no longer receive from the U.S. To make the sanctions effective, the United States will need the cooperation of its major allies.

The grain cutoff could cause the Soviets the greatest potential hardship. The Soviet Union needs to import large quantities of feed grain to ensure a desired supply of meat for its population. Any Soviet meat shortage resulting from U.S. action could increase domestic pressure on the Soviet government. The Soviet Union could replace much of the lost U.S. grain with imports from countries such as Australia, Canada, and Argentina, although the President has indicated that these countries will support the U.S. move by refusing to supply extra grain to the Soviets. There are no alternate

suppliers for the large quantities of corn the Soviets import from the United States.

Similar factors apply in evaluating the impact of the U.S. decision to block high-technology exports to the Soviet Union. There are few items on the Soviet shopping list that could not be bought from other Western industrialized countries. It is hoped that U.S. allies will support the U.S. decision by refusing to sell sophisticated equipment to Moscow. In any event, an interruption of high-technology imports is not likely to have the same dramatic short-term impact on the Soviet Union as the grain cutoff, although the long-term impact on the Soviet economy of a total Western embargo on high-technology items could be more serious.

The curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters will mean some loss for the Soviet fishing industry but not of a magnitude that would seriously disrupt the Soviet economy.

The decision to delay consideration of new cultural and economic cooperation agreements, to postpone the opening of new consulates, as well as the threat that the U.S. might not participate in the Moscow Olympics are primarily symbolic moves to demonstrate U.S. concern. They will not punish the Soviet Union to any significant extent.

The United States can and may take other retaliatory actions. In the economic sphere, the possibilities for further measures are limited. The Soviet Union was already barred from Export-Import Bank credits and most-favored-nation status under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. These barriers to trade are not now likely to be rescinded, although there had been some movement in that direction prior to the Afghanistan crisis. Grain sales and high-technology exports, the main items in U.S.-Soviet trade, have already been suspended.

Other possible U.S. reprisals have been suggested. There are a number of bilateral cooperation agreements still in force which could be cancelled or not renewed when they expire. The U.S. could abandon parliamentary and other high-level exchanges between the two countries. The United States could refuse to participate in the 1980 Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, although that Conference could also be used to raise questions of Soviet international behavior, specifically some of their implications for Europe.

Further actions of this nature would, however, raise some serious questions. Beyond dramatizing U.S. concern over Soviet behavior, how would these actions promote major U.S. interests? Given the fact that such moves are not seen as likely to reverse the course on which the Soviet Union has embarked in Afghanistan, will they be seen as demonstrations of American strength and resolve or will they instead be seen as evidence of U.S. helplessness in the face of a serious Soviet challenge? Do such actions by the United States address the real issues in Afghanistan or do they instead serve more to detract from them? Finally if the U.S. and the Soviet Union are entering a period of heightened tensions, as all signs indicate, and if the U.S. is determined to face the long-term Soviet challenge directly -- through defense measures, regional alliances, etc. -- is it prudent to sharply curtail the lines of communication and exposure between the two countries?

China's strong response to the Soviet invasion suggests several possible implications for the United States and for U.S.-Chinese-Soviet relations:

(1) It shows that China feels that it is under increasing Soviet strategic pressure and suggests that Peking may have an even keener interest in pursuing closer strategic cooperation with the United States than in the past -- an interest that has been reflected during Chinese discussions with Defense Secretary Brown in Peking in January 1980. Conversely, because of the Soviet invasion and China's strong response, U.S. policymakers in the Administration have been more inclined to take steps to reassure China of U.S. support -- including the sale of sophisticated technology and perhaps, eventually, arms, even though such sales would represent a serious departure from what had been seen in the past as the U.S. policy of "evenhandedness" toward the Sino-Soviet powers.

(2) It demonstrates a clear Chinese desire to see the United States adopt strong countermeasures against Soviet aggression, and it implies that Peking would like to see the United States remedy what China views as America's currently "helpless" position in competition with the U.S.S.R. for influence in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region.

(3) It shows reinforced Chinese suspicion of Soviet motives in international affairs -- a development that could be expected to reduce whatever interest China may have had in seeking some sort of accommodation with the U.S.S.A. in the Sino-Soviet talks which began on China's initiative last fall. Such a reduction of interest, if perceived clearly by the United States, would serve to counter the arguments of those in the United States who oppose the transfer of technology and arms to China for fear that Peking might reverse course, move closer to the U.S.S.A., and use those American supplies in ways contrary to U.S. interests. It would also affect the arguments of those Americans who judge that the United States should strive to encourage an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and elsewhere.

(4) It demonstrates a continuing hard Chinese line concerning the Soviet Union and Vietnam in Indochina, as well as strong Chinese irritation with the leaders in countries like India, Japan, Great Britain, and perhaps the United States, which have been less than firm -- in China's eyes -- in maintaining pressure on Vietnam and its Soviet backer to withdraw from Cambodia and to stop interference in other areas of Southeast Asia. It implies that China would like to see a strengthening of U.S.-Chinese cooperation to counter the expansion of Soviet-backed forces in this region.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 01/09/80 -- Soviet troops reportedly advanced southward into Baluchistan province, along the Pakistan border.
- The U.N. Security Council voted to convene a special General Assembly session to debate Soviet intervention.
  - The Afghan government declared amnesty for nearly all political prisoners; provincial governors were named for 25 of 28 provinces.
  - The West German press, quoting "well-informed circles," reported that Brezhnev had opposed the Politburo's invasion decision.
- 01/08/80 -- The U.S. declared its readiness to sell Peking a ground satellite station which has military applications.
- Egypt announced a training program for Afghan rebels.
  - State Department spokesman Hodding Carter stated that Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan may have reached as many as 85,000 and that the Soviets appeared to be establishing a permanent military presence in the country.
  - The Associated Press reported from Kabul that the new Soviet-backed Afghan government was secretly continuing the execution of political prisoners.
- 01/07/80 -- President Carter declared that the U.S. will form a consortium with Western and Middle East countries to supply military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
- The Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council's resolution demanding withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan (the vote was 13-2).
- 01/06/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown, visiting Peking, called for "complementary actions" between the U.S. and China to counter Soviet expansion.
- The Soviets accused President Carter of scuttling detente and exploiting the current crisis to renew the "cold war."
- 01/05/80 -- The U.N. Security Council opened debate on the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. Speaking for more than 50 nations that formally protested Moscow's actions, Egypt and Pakistan led the debate. A draft proposal drawn up by several Third World nations called for a resolution that would not name the Soviet Union specifically but condemned "foreign forces in Afghanistan."
- 01/04/80 -- President Carter announced a sharp reduction in shipments of

American grain to the U.S.S.R, a temporary ban on sale of "high technology" items, a severe curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in American waters, and the deferral of most Soviet-American cultural exchange programs. These actions were in response to what Carter termed a "callous violation of international law" by the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.

01/02/80 -- Babrak Karmal, the new Afghan president installed by the Soviet Union, requested more defense aid from Moscow, Vietnam and Cuba to root "all enemies" of his government.

-- The U.S. recalled its Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

12/29/79 -- Soviet infantry divisions moved into Afghanistan, increasing the total number of combat troops to nearly 30,000.

-- President Carter informed Soviet leader Brezhnev that continuation of the Soviet drive would have serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.

12/28/79 -- The Soviet Union confirmed that its troops were operating in support of the new Afghan government. Soviet news agency Tass justified the involvement under the terms of the Dec. 5, 1978, friendship treaty with Afghanistan.

12/27/79 -- President Amin was overthrown by Soviet forces. Amin was found guilty by a revolutionary tribunal of crimes against the Afghan people and was executed. Radio Kabul reported that "moral, financial, and military help" in the coup came from the Soviet Union.

12/26/79 -- The State Department accused the Soviet Union of "blatant military interference" in Afghanistan, citing a 750-plane airlift of troops and field equipment, which it said quadrupled the number of Soviet combat troops from 1,500 to 6,000.

12/13/79 -- U.S. concern about a growing Soviet role in Afghanistan was expressed to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Vasev by Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

09/12/79 -- President Mohammad Taraki was replaced by Prime Minister Amin. Taraki's death was later announced.

08/09/79 -- Amin acknowledged that up to 1,600 Soviet advisors were stationed in the country to help direct the war against Muslim rebels.

08/01/79 -- The Soviet Union urged President Taraki to broaden his political base in an effort to combat opposition of traditional Muslim religious groups.

05/18/79 -- Amnesty was announced for an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Afghans who had gone to neighboring Pakistan when the revolutionary regime took power in April 1978.

- 04/10/79 — The Soviets replied to the U.S. in kind in Pravda, printing a warning of unspecified dire consequences if Pakistan, aided by the Iranians, Americans, Chinese and Egyptians, continued to assist Muslim rebels inside Afghanistan.
- 04/00/79 — The Afghan government acknowledged trouble with "reactionary counterrevolutionaries and imperialist lackeys," and began accusing Iran and Pakistan of aiding the rebels. Fighting was reported in 23 of the country's 28 provinces.
- 03/24/79 - 03/28/79 — The Soviet Union intensified its arms buildup. The Carter Administration cautioned the Soviets against interfering militarily in the civil strife in Afghanistan.
- 03/27/79 — Foreign Minister Amin was named prime minister. Taraki remained president and defense minister.
- 02/22/79 — The United States cut aid to Afghanistan for FY79 and 1980.
- 02/14/79 — U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was murdered in Kabul.
- 12/05/78 — The Soviet and Afghan governments signed a 20-year treaty of "Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation." Each party agreed not to join any alliance directed against the other, and to consult each other on all "major international issues" affecting their interests.
- 05/14/78 — An interim constitution kept the existing legal system intact, but a military court was found "to try persons who have committed offenses against the Revolution."
- 04/27/78 - 04/28/78 — A bloody revolution brought to power a Soviet-supported Marxist regime headed by Mohammad Taraki.

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